





he past two decades of international experience
with wholesale electricity markets has demon-
strated that significant consumer harm can result
from firms simply engaging in unilateral profit-max-
imizing behavior given the actions of their competi-
tors. Different from other product markets, coordi-
nated actions among suppliers or the concentration
of production capacity in the hands of a small num-
ber of firms is unnecessary for some suppliers to be
able to raise prices substantially above competitive
levels for sustained periods of time.
Wholesale electricity markets with Hirshman-Her-
findahl Indexes (HHIs) that would not raise market
power concerns if they were from other industries
have been subjected to severe market power prob-
lems. The relevant competition authorities have not
found evidence of coordinated actions to raise prices
in violation of the competition or antitrust law dur-
ing any of these market power episodes.These facts
provide strong evidence that competition or anti-
trust policy as it is applied to other industries may be
insufficient to protect electricity consumers from
substantial economic harm.
The technology of electricity production and rem-
nants of the former monopoly regime imply that
conventional competition policy must be augment-
ed with an industry-specific regulator endowed with
a pre-specified set of responsibilities.This combina-
tion of regulatory oversight and competition law
will provide consumers with the same level of mar-
ket power protection they receive for other prod-
ucts from conventional competition law. An indus-
try-specific regulator is necessary because: (1) uni-
lateral market power problems can be extremely
difficult to predict, and (2) they can impose signifi-
cant economic harm even though they occur for a
short period of time.
Clearly specified regulatory safeguards tailored to
the electricity supply industry are needed to prevent
the harmful exercise of unilateral market power
before it can occur and rapidly implement the neces-
sary remedies if it does occur. The primary goal of
this regulatory process should be to prevent market
participant behavior that significantly degrades sys-
tem reliability and market efficiency, rather than
prevent the exercise of unilateral market power.
The role of the regulatory process is to ensure that
the conditions necessary for vigorous competition
exist and to limit the economic harm associated with
the exercise of unilateral market power when they
do not exist.Regulatory mechanisms that attempt to
prevent all exercise of unilateral market power can
introduce market inefficiencies that cause more eco-
nomic harm than the market power they are at-
tempting to prevent.
Why electricity is different
It is difficult to conceive of an industry more suscep-
tible to the exercise of unilateral market power than
electricity. It possesses virtually all of the product
characteristics that enhance the ability of suppliers
to exercise unilateral market power. Supply must
equal demand at every instant in time and each loca-
tion of the network.Electricity is very costly to store
and production is subject to extreme capacity con-
straints in the sense that it is impossible to produce
more than a pre-specified amount of energy from a
generation unit in an hour. Delivery of the product
consumed must also take place through a potential-
ly congested transmission network. How electricity
has been priced to final consumers makes wholesale
demand extremely inelastic,if not perfectly inelastic,
with respect to the wholesale price. The technology
of electricity production historically favored large
generation facilities, and in most wholesale markets
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the vast majority of these facilities are owned by a
relatively small number of firms. Finally, generation
capacity ownership also tends to be concentrated in
small geographic areas within these regional whole-
sale markets. All of these factors also make whole-
sale electricity markets substantially less competitive
the shorter the time lag is between the date the sale
is negotiated and the date delivery of the electricity
occurs.
The uncertain availability of generation units and
portions of the transmission network implies that
system conditions can arise when virtually any gen-
eration unit owner in the wholesale market possess-
es substantial market power in the local market cre-
ated by the transmission congestion or generation
unit outages. Consequently, a prospective local mar-
ket power mitigation (LMPM) mechanism that pro-
vides effective bid mitigation is a necessary compo-
nent of any wholesale market design. The need for
an independent entity charged with the design and
administration of the LMPM mechanism implies the
first rationale for an industry-specific regulator.
A second rationale for an industry-specific regulator
during the transition period is the potential for small
market design flaws that cause little harm during
most system conditions to lead to substantial con-
sumer harm under certain system conditions. The
experience of California illustrates this point. From
the start of the California market in April 1998 until
April 2000, it was probably the most competitive
wholesale market in the US. Conditions changed
when it became clear that the amount of hydroelec-
tric energy available from the Pacific Northwest dur-
ing the summer of 2000 was significantly less than
the previous two summers.
As documented in Wolak (2003a), the five largest
fossil fuel electricity suppliers in California now
faced significantly less elastic residual demand
curves than they did during first two summers of the
market and these suppliers found it in their unilater-
al interest to bid less aggressively into the spot mar-
ket in order to raise wholesale electricity prices in
California.As discussed in Wolak (2003b), this strat-
egy was not unilaterally profitable during the first
two years of the market because the greater avail-
ability of hydroelectric energy from the Pacific
Northwest and inexpensive coal-fired energy from
the Desert Southwest during that time period caused
these suppliers to face significantly more elastic
residual demand curves.
This change in competitive conditions during the
summer of 2000 enabled in-state suppliers to raise
prices substantially through their unilateral actions.
The California experience demonstrates that some
market design flaws, in this case insufficient for-
ward contracting by electricity retailers, can be rel-
atively benign under a range of system conditions.
However, when system conditions conducive to the
exercise of unilateral market power occur,this mar-
ket design flaw can cause enormous harm to con-
sumers. Consequently, industry-specific regulatory
oversight is necessary to intervene as quickly as
possible to limit harm when these system condi-
tions arise.
Besides the need to correct market design flaws after
they are determined to be harmful, there is also a
need to engage in prospective market monitoring to
find market design flaws that lead to substantial
harm by less noticeable means. Aspects of the mar-
ket design can enhance the ability of suppliers to
exercise their unilateral market power. Therefore,
another important role for an industry-specific regu-
lator is to monitor the wholesale market to deter-
mine prospectively which market rules might en-
hance the ability of suppliers to exercise unilateral
market power or increase the likelihood that the
attempts of suppliers to coordinate to raise market
prices will be successful.
This role for the industry-specific regulator also
has a pedagogical component. The transition to a
wholesale market regime involves a dramatic
change in behavior by a number of market partici-
pants. Companies that fail to adapt to the new
regime are very likely to go bankrupt and exit the
industry, but there are often significant external
costs to consumers associated with this outcome.
Consequently, an industry-specific regulator can
take prospective actions to encourage adaptation
to the new regime and limit the resulting external
costs if this change in market participant behavior
does not occur.
Responsibilities of industry-specific regulator
The three major responsibilities of the industry-
specific regulator are: (1) disseminating informa-
tion to existing and prospective market partici-
pants, (2) ensuring compliance with all the market
rules, and (3) protecting against behavior that de-
grades market efficiency and system reliability.“Smart sunshine regulation”
A minimal requirement of any industry-specific reg-
ulatory process is to provide “smart sunshine regula-
tion”.The regulator must have access to all informa-
tion needed to operate the market and be able to
perform analyses of this data and release the results
to the public. At the most basic level, the regulator
should be able to replicate market-clearing prices
and quantities given the bids submitted by market
participants, total demand and other information
about system conditions. This is necessary for the
regulator to verify that the market is operated in a
manner consistent with what is written in the market
rules.
The second crucial aspect of “smart sunshine regula-
tion” is public data release. Specifically, all data sub-
mitted to real-time market and produced by the sys-
tem operator should be immediately released to the
public. The public data release should identify the
market participant and specific generation unit asso-
ciated with each bid, generation schedule or output
level. Masking the identity of the market partici-
pants, as is done in all US wholesale markets, limits
the disciplining value of public data release on mar-
ket participant behavior.
Another potential benefit associated with public
data release is that it enables third-parties to un-
dertake analyses of market performance. The US
policies on data release severely limit the benefits
from this aspect of a public data release policy.
Releasing data with the identities of the market
participant masked makes it impossible to defini-
tively match data from other sources to specific
market participants. For example, some market
performance measures require matching data on
generation unit-level heat rates or input fuel prices
obtained from other sources to specific generation
units. Strictly speaking, this is impossible to do if
the unit name or market participant name is not
matched with the generation unit.
A long time-lag between the date the data is pro-
duced and the date it is released, as is the case in all
US markets,also greatly limits the range of questions
that can be addressed with this data. Taking the
example of the California electricity crisis, by
1 January 2001, the date that masked data from June
of 2000 was first made available to the public, the
exercise of unilateral market power in California had
already resulted in more than $5 billion in overpay-
ments to suppliers in the California electricity mar-
ket, as measured by Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak
(2002). Consequently, a long time-lag between the
date the data is produced and the date it is released
to the public has an enormous potential cost to con-
sumers that should be balanced against the benefits
of delaying the data release.
Ensuring compliance with market rules
Many market outcomes that are harmful to system
reliability and market efficiency could be prevented
if market participants fulfilled all of their contractual
obligations.If the cost of violating a contractual com-
mitment or market rule is less than the unilateral
benefit from this action, the market participant will
find it profitable to violate, which also adversely
impacts system reliability and market efficiency.This
logic implies that the second responsibility of the
regulatory process is to: (1) design market rules to
resemble publicly verifiable contractual obligations
and (2) determine the appropriate penalties and
sanctions to deter violations of these rules without
adversely impacting market efficiency or system reli-
ability.
A large fraction of harmful market outcomes can
be prevented and the costs of operating the market
and the costs of participating in the market will be
lower if all market participants are confident that
all contractual commitments will be honored
regardless of system conditions. Contract enforce-
ment costs stem from ambiguous or overly broad
market rules or market rules that are not,or cannot
be, enforced. A transparent rule that can be rigor-
ously enforced is superior to an overly broad rule
that is difficult to enforce. Irregular enforcement,
either because of imprecise rules or inconsistent
effort, increases the cost of market participation.
This can also lead to increased market rule viola-
tions as more market participants push the bound-
aries of acceptable behavior.
This logic implies that regulators should divide mar-
ket rules into two categories:(1) those that resemble
publicly verifiable contractual obligations with little
subjective judgement to determine compliance, and
(2) those that require a formal administrative pro-
cess to determine compliance.Rules in first category
should be written to limit ambiguity and simplify
enforcement. Those in the second category should
have pre-specified administrative processes that
deter behavior harmful to system reliability and
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market efficiency because of the large amount of
judgement associated with determining that a viola-
tion has occurred.
Both types of market rules require penalty and
sanction mechanisms, but for slightly different pur-
poses. In both cases, penalties and sanctions are
imposed to deter market rule violations. For the
market rules for which determining compliance is
straightforward, the penalties and sanctions are the
primary mechanism for deterring violations. For the
cases that require subjective judgement to deter-
mine a violation,penalties and sanctions are the ulti-
mate backstop, but the administrative process is the
primary mechanism for preventing harmful market
outcomes.
Protecting against behavior harmful to market
efficiency and system reliability
The final responsibility for the regulator is to deter
behavior that is harmful to system reliability and
market efficiency. This behavior may still occur
despite public disclosure of the market outcome and
the offending actions of the market participant as
well as the assessment of penalties for market-rule
violations. The regulator should have the authority
to intervene if all of these actions fail to stop the
harmful market outcomes. Protecting against harm-
ful  market outcomes is the most complex aspect of
the regulatory process,but it also has the potential to
yield the greatest benefit. It involves a number of
inter-related tasks.
Local market power mitigation (LMPM) mechanism.
In all bid-based electricity markets a local market
power mitigation mechanism is necessary to limit the
price bids a supplier submits when there is insuffi-
cient competition to serve a local energy need. An
LMPM mechanism is a pre-specified administrative
procedure (usually written into the market rules)
that determines:(1) when a supplier has local market
power worthy of mitigation, (2) what the mitigated
supplier will be paid, and (3) how the amount the
supplier is paid will impact the payments received by
other market participants. It is increasingly clear to
regulators around the world, particularly those that
operate markets using Locational Marginal Pricing
(LMP), that formal regulatory mechanisms are nec-
essary to deal with the problem of insufficient com-
petition to serve certain local energy needs.
Formulate and implement efficiency-enhancing
market rule changes. The regulator must determine
which market rules detract from market efficiency or
system reliability and formulate and implement the
appropriate market rule changes. Because the level
and geographic distribution of demand, the mix of
input fuels used and ownership shares for generation
capacity in the control area,and the configuration of
the transmission network can all change over time,
market rules must also change. The regulator must
continually analyze and assess the market efficiency
impacts of all market rules. Once it has identified a
deficient market rule, the regulator must then work
with the system and market operators to devise the
necessary remedy. This duty underscores the need
for the regulator to analyze market performance
using the data it has compiled.
Penalize behavior harmful to system reliability and
market efficiency. The regulator is the first line of
defense against harmful market outcomes.
Persistent behavior by a market participant that is
harmful to market efficiency or system reliability
should be subject to penalties and sanctions. In
order to assess these penalties, the regulator must
first determine whether the market participant
intended to harm system reliability and market
efficiency. The market rules should contain a gen-
eral provision prohibiting persistent behavior
detrimental to system reliability and market effi-
ciency. The goal of this provision is to establish a
process for the regulator to intervene to prevent a
market meltdown. A well-defined process must
exist for the regulator to intervene to protect mar-
ket participants and correct the market design flaw
facilitating this harm.
Determine when market activities can be temporari-
ly suspended.The regulator must have the ability to
suspend market operations on a temporary basis
when system conditions warrant it. The suspension
of market operations should only occur after a pre-
specified administrative procedure has been fol-
lowed and it has been determined that it is the only
option available to the regulator to prevent signifi-
cant harm to market efficiency and system reliabil-
ity. As has been demonstrated in various countries
around the world, electricity markets can some-
times become wildly dysfunctional and impose
enormous harm over a very short period time.
Under these sorts of circumstances, the regulator
should have the ability to suspend market opera-
tions temporarily until the problem can be dealt
with through a longer-term regulatory intervention
or market rule change.Preventing behavior detrimental to system 
reliability and market efficiency
This aspect of the regulatory process addresses the
concerns about harmful market outcomes typically
voiced by parties claiming market manipulation.
However, it avoids what I believe to be the impossi-
ble task of demonstrating that a market participant
manipulated the market. Whether a market partici-
pant’s actions constitute market manipulation de-
pends on one’s perspective. Viewed from one per-
spective, all suppliers that attempt to impact the
price they are paid through their own unilateral
actions are engaging in market manipulation.
The extent of unilateral market power possessed by
a supplier is typically measured by its ability to move
market prices through its unilateral actions. Conse-
quently, a blanket prohibition of market manipula-
tion written into the market rules seems to prohibit
suppliers from maximizing profits given the actions
of their competitors. These actions can lead to mar-
ket outcomes that benefit consumers when all sup-
pliers face sufficient competition. This logic is why
there is no explicit prohibition against market mani-
pulation under US antitrust law – it amounts to pro-
hibiting behavior that is a major driver of the bene-
fits in competitive markets.
The prohibition of behavior that is detrimental to sys-
tem reliability and market efficiency focuses on iden-
tifying and eliminating detrimental behavior by mar-
ket participants rather than on punishing this behav-
ior. Penalties and sanctions are a last resort when all
other options for eliminating the behavior have been
tried, including asking the market participant to stop
because of the significant harm this behavior is
imposing on other market participants.
The major difficulty associated with implement-
ing this market rule is that the regulator would
have to infer from a market participant’s behavior
whether its bidding, scheduling, or operating be-
havior intended to harm system reliability or mar-
ket efficiency. If the regulator identifies behavior
that is detrimental to system reliability, and has
clear evidence (for example, a whistleblower or
internal correspondence) that the market partici-
pant engaged in this behavior with full knowledge
that it significantly harmed system reliability or
market efficiency, penalties may be imposed with-
out first going through the administrative process
to determine intent.
However, it seems very unlikely that the regulator
would have direct evidence of intent, particularly if
there is a market rule that imposes significant penal-
ties on the market participants that have been shown
to have engaged in this type of behavior.Enforcing a
“behavior detrimental to system reliability and mar-
ket efficiency” provision is more difficult if this mar-
ket rule also imposed the very reasonable require-
ment that this detrimental behavior must also have a
significant impact on market outcomes. This would
require the regulator to make the often very subjec-
tive determination of what constitutes a “significant”
market impact.
A key feature of this market rule is a transparent
process for identifying intentional behavior detri-
mental to system reliability or market efficiency.This
should include a process for taking the actions nec-
essary to stop this behavior or the harm that it caus-
es.The focus of this process should be on stopping as
quickly as possible intentional behavior that the reg-
ulator determines causes significant harm to market
efficiency and system reliability.
As should be clear from the above discussion, the
major focus of this process is on eliminating the
harmful behavior as soon as possible, not on assign-
ing blame or imposing penalties. Only when public
disclosure of the actions and the regulator’s own
investigation fails to stop or eliminate the harm asso-
ciated with this behavior should the regulator
attempt to determine intent and assign penalties for
this behavior.
Coordinating antitrust and regulatory policy
We conclude with a brief discussion of how the
industry-specific regulatory process should interact
with the antitrust authority. The primary concern of
the regulatory process is protecting against the eco-
nomic harm associated with unilateral exercise of
market power. Antitrust policy is concerned with
detecting coordinated actions to raise prices and
combinations (typically mergers) that result in a sub-
stantial lessening of competition. Antitrust law also
prohibits attempts to monopolize, but this is unlike-
ly to be relevant to the electricity industry beyond its
implications for merger analysis.
The industry-specific regulator is the first line of
defense for consumers against harmful market out-
comes. While the industry-specific regulator may
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wish to approve mergers,this seems redundant if the
antitrust authority does a thorough review. Given
the expertise of the industry-specific regulator, a
thorough review would require that the antitrust
authority to solicit extensive input from the industry-
specific regulator, including the provision of indus-
try-specific data that is part of the ongoing regulato-
ry process.
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